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I. INTRODUCTION

According to the Washington Post, 991 people were shot to
death by police officers in the United States during calendar year
2015, and 957 people were fatally shot in 2016.1
A
disproportionate percentage of the citizens killed in these policecivilian encounters were black. 2 Events in Ferguson, Missouri;
Chicago, Illinois; Charlotte, North Carolina; Baton Rouge,
Louisiana; and Staten Island, New York-to name but a few
affected cities-have now exposed deep distrust between
communities of color and law enforcement. Greater transparency
is necessary to begin to heal this culture of distrust and to inform
the debate going forward about police practices in America.
The recent spate of deadly police-civilian encounters has
generated enormous media coverage, national discourse, and a
proliferation of recommended solutions. Perhaps the most notable
and comprehensive set of recommendations was issued by the
President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing. Created by
President Obama in December 2014, the task force consisted of
nine members drawn from police, academic and other law
enforcement-related professions. 3 In its Final Report, issued in
May 2015, the committee proffered a number of recommendations
that stressed, among other things, the need for altering law
enforcement culture, improving training, and forging better policecommunity partnerships.4 But the committee defined its principal
task in terms of needing to improve police-community trust.5 It
declared that trust "is essential in a democracy" and central to the
"stability of our communities, the integrity of our criminal justice
system, and the safe and effective delivery of policing services." 6
Healthy perceptions about the police serve several purposes:
they nurture positive norms surrounding law-abiding behavior,

I

Kimbriell Kelley et al., Fatal Shootings by Police Remain Relatively Unchanged After
Two Years, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/fatalshootings-by-police-remain-relatively-unchanged-after-two-years/2016/12/30/fc807596-c3ca-11
e6-9578-0054287507db-story.html?utm term=.e3ala9be36f6.
2 Id.
3 FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, at v (May

2015), https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf.
4 Id. at 1-4.
5 Id. at 5.
6 Id.
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make police work easier by encouraging citizens to report crime,
and make it more likely that people will credit testimony of police
witnesses if they are ever called to serve on a jury in a criminal
case. In short, public trust not only helps advance the police
investigative function, but it also serves to legitimize the
attendant criminal adjudicative process.
The public's perception of law enforcement legitimacy is highly
influenced by actions that occur at a very critical and early
juncture of the criminal justice process-the grand jury. The
paucity of grand jury indictments returned in cases involving
police-involved shootings has caused many to question the
integrity of the grand jury process. 7 Grand jury secrecy and the
prosecutor's unchecked discretion with respect to the presentation
of evidence are inherent characteristics of grand jury practice. 8
While they were enacted to serve the twin goals of noncorruptibility and efficiency, they also greatly facilitate a
prosecutor's ability to secure an indictment if he wishes and to
secure a no-bill if he does not.
When the Supreme Court first referred to the grand jury as a
"shield" in the case of United States v. Mandujano, it was referring
to the grand jury's function as a shield against the arbitrary
exercise of governmental power.9 Requiring indictments to be
commenced by grand jury investigation and vote assures (1) that
7 On average, only one percent of the annual killings of civilians by police officers
ultimately produced an indictment charging police with criminal misconduct of any kind.
Kelly et al., supra note 1; Zachary A. Goldfarb, The Single Chart That Shows That Federal
Grand Juries Indict 99.99 Percent of the Time, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.was
hingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/11/24/the-single-chart-that-shows-that-grand-juries-ind
ict-99-99-percent-of-the-time/?utmterm=.7ef4c328658a ("Grand juries, at least at the federal
level, almost always vote to indict people accused by prosecutors of a crime.... [Flederal
prosecutors pursued over 160,000 cases against defendants in 2009-2010 (the last period for
which there is data), and grand juries only voted not to return an indictment in 11.... Grand
juries, at least at the state level, often do not indict police officers.").
8 See Matthew Hector, Grand Juries in the Spotlight, 103 ILL. B.J. 15, 15 (2015)
(describing the "secret nature of grand jury proceedings"); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Should the
American Grand Jury Survive Ferguson?, 58 How. L.J. 825, 828-29 (2015) ("[The
prosecutor may present a case unencumbered by most of the evidentiary, procedural, and
constitutional rules that govern the petit jury's consideration at trial. . . . In other words,
the deck is stacked in favor of the government . . .. The truth is that prosecutors do have
significant control over grand jury proceedings and, therefore, can engineer outcomes if they
desire.").
9 425 U.S. 564, 573 (1976); see also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962) (describing
the grand jury's role in safeguarding against over-callous prosecutors).
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charges are not commenced without probable cause, (2) that the
reputation of the putative target is protected in the event that
charges are not forthcoming,
and (3) that community
representatives are involved in the decisionmaking process. 10
However, recent high profile cases suggest that the prosecutor
may now be using the grand jury as a shield of a very different
sort-that is, a shield from public accountability.
A prosecutor
who wishes to avoid bringing difficult charges against a police
officer can present a lopsided case to the grand jury and then, with
a wink and a nod, blame the decision not to indict on community
representatives rather than acknowledging and justifying the
decision himself. In essence, the shield function of the grand jury
is now being twisted to the prosecutor's advantage.
In this Essay, we will suggest three modest but important
reforms to the grand jury process that we think will help increase
transparency, reduce the legitimacy deficit, and restore public
confidence in what are admittedly very difficult charging decisions
involving the police use of deadly force. Part I examines grand
jury secrecy rules in the context of externally created evidence
(e.g., dash-cam and body-cam videos) and argues for a uniform,
interpretive approach consistent with that followed by a majority
of states. Part II discusses evidence presentation before the- grand
jury and urges the adoption of a rule that mandates the recording
of grand jury instructions. Finally, Part III argues that state
criminal procedure rules should be amended to empower states'
attorneys to move the court for the public release of redacted
grand jury minutes in instances when a no-bill is returned and it
is in the public interest.
II. RECORDS MARKED BEFORE THE GRAND JURY: THE NEED FOR A
UNIFORM APPROACH

Federal grand jury secrecy rules, which are set forth in Rule
6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure," are interpreted
10 Wood, 370 U.S. at 390.
11 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B) (delineating individuals who "must not disclose a matter
occurring before the grand jury"); 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.5(b)
(4th ed. 2015) ("Grand jury secrecy requirements are imposed in almost every jurisdiction
by statute or court rule. Secrecy provisions typically state that the grand jurors and
specified persons appearing before the grand jury ... are bound not to disclose any matter

THE GRAND JURY
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in conjunction with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
Illustrative of this relationship is FOIA exemption (b)(3), which
provides that disclosure "does not apply to matters that
are .

.

. specifically exempted from disclosure by statute." 12

Rule

Thus,
6(e) is a qualifying statute under this exemption.13
information and material that falls within the confines of Rule 6(e)
are exempted from public disclosure pursuant to exemption (b)(3).
As a general matter, state FOIA rules mirror those in the federal
FOIA provision.14 Thus, information and material protected under
local grand jury secrecy laws are usually, if not always, exempt
from disclosure under state FOIA rules.
Though the interrelationship between the two provisions is
relatively easy to define, more intricate questions are presented in
regards to the scope of the evidentiary matter subject to the
secrecy rules. Certain questions in this context, such as witness
grand jury testimony and grand jury witness identity, are
comparatively straightforward and rarely present debatable
issues.15
On the other hand, questions regarding evidence
generated outside and independent of the grand jury process (e.g.,
subpoenaed documents and physical evidence) have produced an
uneven landscape of judicial and governmental responses.
Nevertheless, a majority approach has emerged-followed in the
federal courts and in most states-which holds that evidence that
has its origins outside of the context of the grand jury and was
occurring before the grand jury except in accordance with a judicial order authorized by the
secrecy provision or some other specified exception.").
12 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2016).
13 Butler v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 368 F. Supp. 2d 776, 785 (E.D. Mich. 2005); see also
Rugiero v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 257 F.3d 534, 549 (6th Cir. 2001); Solar Sources, Inc. v.
United States, 142 F.3d 1033, 1037 n.4 (7th Cir. 1998); Church of Scientology Int'l v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 30 F.3d 224, 235 (1st Cir. 1994); McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227,
1246-47 (3d Cir. 1993); Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. Nat'l Archives & Records Serv., 656
F.2d 856, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
14 132 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 3d 1 § 14 (2013) ("The exemptions in the state freedom of
information laws are similar to those in the Federal FOIA. Generally, the Federal FOIA
covers classified matters of national defense or foreign policy; agency internal rules and
practices; information specifically exempted by other statutes; trade secrets, commercial, or
financial information; privileged interagency or intra-agency memoranda or letters;
personal information affecting an individual's privacy; investigatory records compiled for
law enforcement purposes; financial institution records; geographical and geophysical
information concerning wells."). See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 7(26)(f) (2017).
15 SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JuRY LAw AND PRACTICE § 5.6 (2d ed. 2016) (stating
general rules about grand jury secrecy).
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independently generated is generally not subject to the grand jury
secrecy rule. 16 The determining factor, however, is not the
material's birthplace but whether the evidentiary matter reveals
something of "essence" about the grand jury deliberative process.
As stated by the Fourth Circuit in In re Grand Jury Subpoena:
The substantive content of "matters occurring before
the grand jury" can be anything that may reveal what
has transpired before the grand jury. . . . However,
Rule 6(e)(2) protects from disclosure "only the essence
of what takes place in the grand jury room, in order to
preserve the freedom and integrity of the deliberative
process."17

Thus, the mere fact that an evidentiary item was introduced
during the course of a grand jury investigation does not
necessarily shield that item from disclosure.18 Similarly, the mere
fact that an evidentiary item was generated independently of a
grand jury investigation does not render it automatically
disclosable. 19 Rather, the central inquiry is whether its public
release would disclose something about the inner workings of the
grand jury.
If yes, the item is automatically shielded from
disclosure. If not, the item is not protected by Rule 6(e), but it may
sometimes be withheld under the criminal investigative exception
of a state's freedom of information act. 2 0
Despite this majority approach, there have been some notable
high-profile deviations where the government has resisted public
disclosure, citing grand jury secrecy as a rationale. Consider the
well-publicized case of Laquan McDonald, the seventeen year-old
who was killed in Chicago, Illinois, on October 20, 2014, after being
repeatedly fired upon by an officer with the Chicago Police

Id.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 920 F.2d 235, 241-42 (4th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted);
see also In re Grand Jury Matter (Catania), 682 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 610 F.2d 202, 216-17 (5th Cir. 1980); Anaya v. United States, 815 F.2d 1373,
1378-79 (10th Cir. 1987).
16

17

18

BEALE ET AL., supra note 15,

§

5.6.

19 Id.
20 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4,

§ 7(26)(f)

(2017).
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Department (CPD). 21 In response to an Illinois Freedom of
Information Act request that sought the production of, inter alia, a
dash cam video which depicted the shooting, the CPD resisted its
release. 22 In its first affirmative defense, the CPD argued that the
release of the video would compromise the city's ongoing criminal
investigation as well as a pending federal grand jury investigation. 2 3
But a circuit court judge in Cook County, Illinois, disagreed, finding
that the CPD could not rely upon ongoing investigations performed
by entities (U.S. Attorney, FBI, State Attorneys, and federal grand
jury) other than the CPD. 2 4 And, assuming a right on the part of
the CPD to rely upon such investigations, the court further found
that the department was unable to demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that the video's release "would .. . obstruct an
ongoing criminal investigation." 25
Dash-cam, body-cam, and cell phone videos, as well as footage
from cameras publicly mounted and those hoisted by businesses,
are preexisting materials that, except in rare circumstances, are
generated for purposes independent of a grand jury investigation.
Thus, the mere presentation of such material before the grand
jury, without more, does not justify their suppression from public
view. As noted, the federal courts and the majority of state courts
follow this approach. But the problem lies with the growing
minority of states that do not.2 6 It is these states that effectively
21 Smith v. Chicago Police Dep't, No. 2015 CH 11780, 1 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co., Ill. Nov. 19,
2015), https://assets.documenteloud.org/documents/2638910/Ruling-ordering-release-of-Laqua
n-McDonald-video.pdf.
22 Id. at 2.
23 Id. at 3.
2A Id. at 17-18.
25 Id. at 18.
For other instances where the government resisted the release of dash-cam
videos, see also State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Deters, No. 2015-1222, 2016 WL 7386206
(Ohio Dec. 20, 2016) (stating that the prosecutor resisted the newspaper's formal request for
release of bodycam video, claiming that it would "taint grand jury investigation"); Lee
Hermiston, Dash Camera Footage of Jerime Mitchell Shooting Released, CEDAR RAPIDS
GAZETTE (Dec. 8, 2016, 2:57 PM), httpJ//www.thegazette.com/subject/news/public-safetyllinn-c
(describing the
ounty/dash-camera-footage-of-jerime-mitchell-shooting-released-20161208
government resisting calls for release of dash-cam video of officer shooting of Jerime Mitchell
in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, until after grand jury decided against charging the officer).
26 Niraj Chokshi, These Are the States That Want to Regulate Police Body Camera Videos,
WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.cominews/post-nation/wp/2016/02/2
5/these-are-the-states-that-want-to-regulate-police-body-camera-videos/9utmterm=.0d5b9c87
79eb (stating that "[a] dozen states explicitly restrict public access to police body camera
footage, while a dozen more are considering limits'); Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure,
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block public access to critical information that would otherwise be
subject to public disclosure. Illustrative of this trend is a law
passed in North Carolina in 2016, which establishes that law
enforcement recordings, such as dash-cam and body-cam videos,
are not considered public records. 27 Under the law, individuals
whose images or voices appear in the video may request a viewing
of the tape, but are neither guaranteed such an opportunity nor
are they permitted to make a copy. 2 8 Only a court can authorize
the public release of such recordings. 29
The impact of such laws is clear. The exemption of preexisting
tapes and material from public records laws will hinder the ability
of aggrieved individuals to demonstrate police misconduct, will
heighten community-police tensions, and will deepen community
distrust of the criminal adjudicative process. Indeed, if such laws
proliferate, then public distrust of the grand jury charging process
will be exacerbated rather than ameliorated.3 0
Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 68 AIA. L. REV. 395, 400-01 nn.20-22 (2016) (detailing
information regarding various state body camera public disclosure laws); Serena Lei, Police
Body-Worn Cameras: Where Your State Stands, URBAN INSTITUTE (2016), http://apps.urban.
org/features/body-cameral (discussing various laws across the states regarding body cameras);
State Law Enforcement Body Camera Policies, EPIC (2017), https://epic.org/ state-policy/policecams/ (discussing recently enacted laws in Florida and North Dakota regarding public access
to police camera evidence, as well as pending legislation in various states).
27 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 88 (exempting from public records "visual, audio, or visual and
audio recording[s] captured by a body-worn camera, a dashboard camera, or any other video or
audio recording device operated by or on behalf of a law enforcement agency or law
enforcement agency personnel when carrying out law enforcement responsibilities'); Jonah
Engel Bromwich, Video of Charlotte Police Shooting Could Be the Last Released in North
Carolina, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/27/us/keith-scott-sho
oting-video-charlotte.html; Wesley Lowery, More Police Shootings are Being Caught on
Camera-But Many of Those Videos Aren't Released to the Public, WASH. POST (Sept. 22,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.comnews/post-nation/wp/2016/09/22/more-police-shooting
s-are-being-caught-on-camera-but-many-of-those-videos-arent-released-to-the-public?utmter
m=.4555eb462d24.
28 See 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 88 (indicating that the head of a law enforcement agency
may disclose recordings to a limited number of individuals, but emphasizing that requests
for such disclosure can be rejected upon consideration of various factors).
29 Alan Neuhauser, North Carolina Blocks Release of Police Video, U.S. NEWS (July 13,
2016), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-07-13/north-carolina-law-blocks-release-of-p
olice-video ('[R]ecordings from body- or dashboard-mounted cameras can only be released to
the public through a court order, instead of via a public records request").
30 See Julie Craven, North CarolinaDoesn't Seem to Want People to See Police Camera
Footage, HUFFINGTON POST (July 12, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/north-car
olina-police-camera-footage-us_57850a43e4b0ed2111d7952a ("While police camera footage
does help the public hold police officers accountable, it rarely leads to indictments or
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The majority approach to grand jury secrecy properly
safeguards the grand jury deliberative process, as well as
attendant privacy interests, and appropriately delimits the
boundary line between protected and non-protected grand jury
material. Concluding that dash-cam and body-cam videos are not
protected by mandatory grand jury secrecy rules does not mean
that they will be automatically discoverable; it just means the
police departments and prosecutor's offices will have the discretion
to disclose them to the public if they believe such disclosure will
not compromise an ongoing criminal investigation. 3 1 Quite simply,
law enforcement officers should not hide behind grand jury secrecy
rules in pretending that certain items are automatically nondisclosable-they should be transparent and take ownership of
discretion when the law vests them with such.
that independently
generated
A rule that recognizes
evidentiary matter with origins outside the grand jury is not
subject to grand jury secrecy provides a clear guideline for the
government to follow in the event of a formal request for the
release of such information. Our endorsement of the majority
approach to grand jury secrecy provides greater clarification
regarding what grand jury material is subject to public disclosure,
enhances transparency and community trust in the criminal
adjudicative process, and aids in improving police-community
relations.
Consider the findings in a 2015 report prepared by an Ad Hoc
Police Practices Review Commission subcommittee in Fairfax
County, Virginia. 32 The committee was formed "after public outcry
over the lack of information or movement in the still unresolved"

convictions. In 2015, only 15 officers were indicted on murder or manslaughter charges for
on-duty killings of civilians - and 10 of the cases involved video. That's a sharp increase
from the prior average of less than five indictments per year over 10 years. But still, no
police officers were actually convicted on murder or manslaughter charges in 2015.").
31 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 7(26)(f) (2016) (allowing withholding of "investigatory
materials necessarily compiled out of the public view by law enforcement or other
investigatory officials the disclosure of which materials would probably so prejudice the
possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public
interest").
32 Tom
Jackman, Report: Fairfax Police Need 'Real Change-Now' in Public
Communications, WASH. POST (July 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/w
p/2015/07/24/report-fairfax-pohce-need-real-change-now-in-pubhc-communications/?utm term
=.aa934acflaf7.
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shooting death of an unarmed Springfield, Virginia resident in
2013 by a Fairfax County Police Department officer. 33 The report
concluded that it was essential that the police department improve
its community communication and adopt a policy that "fosters
transparency." 34 Specifically, the report cited the mishandling of
"[c]ommunications in recent high-profile use-of-force and critical
incident cases" which produced a diminishment in public trust in
the legitimacy of the police. 35 And it further concluded that had
more transparent departmental policies been in place, the
controversies that led to the creation of the ad hoc commission
would have likely been avoided. 36 The subcommittee also noted
the longstanding practice by the police department of rejecting
record requests pursuant to Virginia's freedom of information
law. 3 7
The report requested that the Board of Supervisors
"publicly adopt a resolution ... to revisit FOIA laws with an eye
toward expanding instead of limiting the public release of
information related to police-involved shootings and other police
practices and procedures related to official police activities." 38

3 Id.; see also Tom Jackman, Ex-Fairfax Officer Adam Torres Pleads Guilty to
Manslaughterin Shooting Death of John Geer, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.wa
shingtonpost.comlnews/true-crimewp/2016/04/18/ex-fairfax-officer-adam-torres-pleads-guil
ty-to-manslaughter-in-shooting-death-of-john-geer/?utm-term=.ce2504f6877c (noting that
disclosures from the wrongful death action arising from the Geer shooting "created an

uproar").
3 Jackman, supra note 32; see also Angela Woolsey, Fairfax County Approves Independent
Auditor for Police, FAIRFAX TIMES (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.fairfaxtimes.com/ articles/fairfaxcounty-approves-independent-auditor-for-policearticlelcflfOec-89bl-11e6-baba-0bb86719ed4
8.html ("In addition to use-of-force practices, the ad hoc commission made recommendations
concerning independent oversight, communications, recruitment and vetting, and mental
health and crisis intervention team (CIT) training.").
3 Jackman, supra note 32.
36 Id.; see also AD HOC POLICE PRACTICES REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 45 (2015),

http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/chairman/pdfladhoc-final-10.8.15.pdf ("If the department had
policies that fostered real transparency, it's unlikely the controversies in recent years would
have lasted so long and there likely would not have even been a call to form this
Commission.").
31 Jackman, supra note 32; see also AD Hoc POLICE PRACTICES REVIEW COMMISSION, supra

note 36, at 13 (recommending that the Fairfax County Police Department stop its practice of
resisting all FOIA requests, and provide explanations in the event that records are withheld).
3

AD HOC POLICE PRACTICES REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 36, at 49.
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III. THE PROSECUTOR'S LEGAL INSTRUCTIONS TO THE GRAND JURY
SHOULD BE RECORDED

The dearth of indictments returned in police-involved shooting
cases has spurred debate on the topic of grand jury reform. The
grand jury is the primary process followed by the federal
government in charging felony cases, and followed by slightly less
than one-half of our fifty states. 39 A grand jury is typically
composed of between sixteen and twenty-three members
impartially drawn from the district wherein it sits, and an
indictment cannot be issued by the body unless a majority of the
quorum present, hearing an evidentiary presentation from only
the prosecution, concludes that probable cause exists that the
individual(s) named in the charging instrument committed the
crimes alleged.
Some reformists have advocated for abandoning the use of the
grand jury altogether in cases involving police-involved killings.
California did just that, passing a statute in 2015 that prohibited
state prosecutors from using the grand jury to investigate police
"use of force" cases. 40 But that special statute was recently struck
down by the California Court of Appeals, which ruled that the
statute was inconsistent with the state constitution's delegation of
power to the grand jury. 41
At the local level, certain district attorneys have reacted to
increasing public skepticism about the grand jury process by
making charging decisions in police use of force cases themselves,
In Charlotte, North
without utilizing that charging body.
Carolina, Mecklenburg County District Attorney Andrew Murray

3 Almost all of the fifty states allow charges to be pursued by means of the grand jury
process, though slightly less than half (twenty-two) now mandate its use in felony cases.

See SUSAN W. BRENNER & LORI E. SHAw, FEDERAL GRAND JURY: A GUIDE TO LAW AND

PRACTICE § 24:2 (2d ed. 2006); see also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 521 (1884)
(neither the Fifth Amendment nor the Due Process Clause requires states to utilize grand
juries to charge felony cases).
* On August 10, 2015, California Governor Jerry Brown signed SB 227 which prohibited
prosecutors from using grand juries in police use of deadly force cases. Melanie Mason,
Gov. Brown Signs Law Banning Grand Juries in Police Deadly Force Cases, L.A. TIMES
(Aug. 11, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-ma-pc-brown-grand-juries-201508
1I-stor y.html.
41 The People ex rel. Vern Pierson v. The Superior Court of El Dorado County, 7 Cal. App.
5th 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
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investigated the controversial shooting of Keith Scott by gathering
the evidence and presenting it to a panel of experts within his own
office, who unanimously concluded that the responsible officer
should not be charged because the suspect presented an imminent
threat of violence at the time of the confrontation. 42
In
Minneapolis, Hennepin County District Attorney Michael
Freeman announced in investigating the shooting death of Jamar
Clark that he will no longer use the grand jury in any future police
shooting case. 4 3 According to Freeman, "the accountability and
transparency limitations are too high to overcome," and he would
rather make these difficult decisions himself.4 4
But abandoning the grand jury is an extreme solution that
forfeits many important procedural tools that law enforcement
may need to uncover the facts. 4 5 It is the equivalent of throwing
the baby out with the bath water. The grand jury has the power to
subpoena records and testimony from reluctant witnesses (such as
fellow officers, family members, or gang associates) which
prosecutors cannot obtain in states that do not grant prosecutors
the power of administrative subpoena. Hospital records, internal
human resources records, and social media communications are
often unavailable to the prosecutor in the absence of a formal
subpoena. Fellow officers concerned about being perceived as
turncoats and crossing the "Thin Blue Line" may be reluctant to
cooperate with the prosecutor without a formal subpoena. In
many states, the district attorney is powerless to apply for a
judicial grant of immunity in the absence of an assertion of a
privilege under oath before the grand jury.46 Perhaps most

42 See Richard Fausset, Charlotte Officer 'Justified'in Fatal Shooting of Keith Scott, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/us/charlotte-officer-acted-lawfu
ly-in-fatal-shooting-of-keith-scott.html.
43 David Chanen, Hennepin County to Stop Using Grand Juries in Officer-Involved
Shootings, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Mar. 16, 2016, http://www.startribune.com/hennepincounty-attorney-to-provide-update-into-jamar-clark-inquiry/372229891/.
4 Amy Forliti, Prosecutor Says No Grand Jury in Minneapolis Police Shooting, SAN

DIEGO TRIB., http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-prosecutor-says-no-grand-jury-in-

minneapolis-2016marl6-story.html.
45 See Randall Eliason, In Defense of the Grand Jury (PartOne), SIDEBARS BLOG, May 24,
2016, https://rdeliason.com/2016/03/24/the-guilty-ham-sandwich-in-defense-of-the-grand-jurypart-1/ (discussing benefits of the grand jury).
46 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20E (2016) (setting forth procedure in
Massachusetts).
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importantly, the grand jury allows a prosecutor to see how
testimony is likely to hold up (or change) under oath when it is
subject to the pains and penalty of perjury, powers not replicable
For all of these reasons, the
in a simple interview setting.
California District Attorneys' Association objected to depriving
prosecutors of the use of the grand jury in cases involving policeinvolved shootings before Governor Brown signed controversial SB
227 in 2015.47
Grand jury manipulation (or public perception of manipulation)
is one of the central problems with respect to police shooting
investigations.4 8 The transcript of the Ferguson, Missouri grand
jury proceeding reveals just how far prosecutors can sometimes go
in skewing factual presentations in police-involved shooting
cases-not only do they fail to "cross examine" police officers such
as Darren Wilson, who would otherwise be perceived as a potential
"target" during any other type of preliminary investigation, but
they closely cross examine and impeach civilian witnesses who
might normally be perceived as neutral and cooperative. 49 There
is little doubt that prosecutors have the ability to shape the case
before the grand jury "as a means to drop cases they don't want to
pursue, without subjecting themselves to the political heat for not
bringing charges."5 0 Though the Ferguson grand jury transcripts

47 Mason, supra note 40.
48 See generally R. Michael Cassidy, Who Should Investigate Police Involved Killings?,

MASS. LAw. WKLY. 47 (May 25, 2015) (advocating the use of independent prosecutors).
49 See Daniel Epps, Adversarial Asymmetry in the Criminal Process, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV.
762 (2016).
6 Id. at 811-13. See Marjorie Cohn, ProsecutorManipulates Grand Jury Process to Shield
Officer, HuFFINGTON POST (Nov. 28, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.comlmarjorie-cohn/pros
ecutor-manipulates-grand-jury-to-shield-officer-b_6240578.html; see also Cohn Taylor Ross,
Policing Pontius Pilate: Police Violence, Local Prosecutors, and Legitimacy, 53 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 755, 763-64 (2016) ('The statistics and popular conception of grand juries did not
square with McCulloch's actions. McCulloch gave an atypically comprehensive presentation to
the grand jury that spanned three months and involved over seventy hours of testimony from
over fifty witnesses, including Wilson. The jury had to weigh both exculpatory and
inculpatory evidence and McCulloch took no stance on whether criminal charges were
warranted. Some legal analysts, and McCulloch himself, said that the reason for the lengthy,
thorough proceeding was so that the jurors-and the public after the release of the jury
transcripts-could see every side of the story. Again, this is a common approach in cases
involving killings by police, but not in similar cases involving civilians.").
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were later released, this imbalance in the proceedings did little to
quell criticism of the grand jury process.5 1
It turns out that the Ferguson grand jury that cleared Darren
Wilson for the death of Michael Brown was misinstructed on the
correct standard to apply to police use of force cases. At the
beginning of the proceedings, the prosecutor instructed the grand
jury that police in Missouri are justified in using deadly force to
arrest a fleeing felon, without regard to whether that felon
possessed a weapon and/or presented a risk of danger to the police
officer or others. 52 The constitutional standard under Tennessee v.
Garner is that, before using deadly force, the police officer must
entertain an objectively reasonable fear that the victim presented
a danger to the officer or to members of the public.5 3 The
prosecutor later clarified this standard after the grand jury had
heard all the evidence. Our point here is that members of the
public and voters in St. Louis County would never have known
about the prosecutor's confusing legal instructions before the
grand jury if these instructions had not been recorded.
Our proposals in this Essay focus on reforms in the grand jury
process, rather than abolition or abandonment of the grand jury.
One badly needed reform is to require that a prosecutor's legal
instructions to the grand jury be recorded. This will serve as a
prophylactic to encourage prosecutors to get the law right, and to
present it to the grand jury in a fair and balanced way.
In federal court 54 and in the majority of jurisdictions that utilize
the grand jury,55 everything that occurs before the grand jury
except the deliberations and vote of the jurors must be recorded.
This practice is consistent with the American Bar Association's
Criminal Justice Standards, which require that "[t]he entirety of
the proceedings occurring before a grand jury, including the
51 In The New Yorker Magazine, Jeffrey Toobin criticized DA Robert McCulloch for
implementing "a document dump," approach to the grand jury that "is virtually without
precedent in the law of Missouri or anywhere else." Jeffrey Toobin, How Not to Use a
Grand Jury, NEW YORKER (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/use-

grand-jury.
52 William Freivogel, Grand Jury Wrangled with Confusing Instructions, ST. LOUIS PUB.
RADIO (Nov. 26, 2014), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/grand-jury-wrangled-confusing-in
structions#stream/0.
53 471 U.S. 1, 6 (1985).
54 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(1).
65 BEALE ET AL., supra note 15, § 4.9.
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prosecutor's communications with and presentations and
instructions to the grand jury, should be recorded in some manner,
and that record should be preserved." 56 Yet eleven states require
only the recording of a witness's "testimony" before the grand
jury,5 7 which means that a prosecutor can put his thumb on the
scale by giving lopsided, misleading, or imbalanced legal
instructions.
These statutes and rules of criminal procedure
should be amended to follow the federal model.
Notably, two state supreme courts have required the recording
of instructions before the grand jury even though the applicable
state rule of criminal procedure did not expressly require it. In
State v. Grewell,5 the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that recording
was necessary to protect against abuse of grand jury proceedings
and a prosecutorial appeal to the passions of the grand jury.
[A] sophisticated prosecutor must acknowledge that
there develops between a grand jury and the
prosecutor with whom the jury is closeted a rapport-a
dependency relationship-which can easily be turned
into an instrument of influence on grand jury
deliberations.
Recordation is the most effective
restraint upon such potential abuses. 59

56 AM.

BAR

AsS'N,

ABA

CRIMINAL

JUSTICE

STANDARDS

FOR

CRIMINAL

JUSTICE:

PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 3-4.5(d) (4th ed. 2015) ('The entirety of the
proceedings occurring before a grand jury, including the prosecutor's communications with
and presentations and instructions to the grand jury, should be recorded in some manner,
and that record should be preserved.").
57 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 938 (West 2016); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/112-7 (West
2016); KY. R. CR. P. 5.16 (2017); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-416 (West 2016); Mi.
R. RCRP MCR 6.107 (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-316 (West 2016); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 29-10.1-16 (West 2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 340 (West 2016); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 23A-5-11.1 (2016); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 20.012 (West 2015); VA CODE
ANN. § 19.2-215.9 (2016).
58 543 N.E.2d 93, 96 (Ohio 1989).
59 Id., quoting United States v. Gramolini, 301 F. Supp. 39, 41-42 (D. R.I. 1969). Ohio
originally required recording of grand jury "proceedings" by interpreting Ohio R. Crim. P. R.
22, which requires proceedings in all felony cases to be recorded and which was originally
interpreted to apply only to trials and pre-trial proceedings. Subsequent decisions clarified
Grewell and confirmed that the prosecutor's legal instructions must also be recorded. State
v. Goff, 2013 WL 139545, at *13, *32 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013).

1016

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1001

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently required
recording of grand jury instructions pursuant to its general
superintendence power over the lower courts. 60
Opponents of our proposal may argue that recording grand jury
instructions will lead to time-consuming pre-trial litigation about
whether the legal instructions were inaccurate, or whether they
were inadequate under the circumstances because they failed to
include instructions on lesser included offenses and possible
affirmative defenses. Yet this critique confuses the question of
whether instructions should be recorded with the question of
whether they should be turned over to the defendant after
indictment. The former does not necessarily require the latter. In
New York, for example, assistant district attorneys have long been
required to record their instructions to the grand jury.6 ' Yet the
transcript of these instructions is not regularly turned over to the
defense counsel. Defense counsel may move at arraignment to
have the court inspect the minutes for error and sufficiency. 62
Only if, after in camera review, the court finds that there may be a
problem with the instructions and that the court would be aided by
the parties briefing does the court order release of the instructions
This procedure seems to have worked
to the defendant. 6 3
reasonably well in New York without substantial added costs to
criminal litigation.
IV. STATE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SHOULD BE AMENDED
TO ALLOW DISCLOSURE OF GRAND JURY MINUTES TO THE PUBLIC IN
LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES

In Ferguson, Missouri, District Attorney Robert McCulloch took
the highly unusual step of releasing to the public minutes of the
grand jury investigation into the death of Michael Brown after a

Commonwealth v. Grassie, 476 Mass. 202, 220 (2017).
People v. Percy, 45 A.D.2d 284, 285 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974), aff'd, 345 N.E.2d 582
(N.Y.S.2d 1975).
62 N.Y. CPL § 210.30 (McKinney 2009).
New York practice differs from federal practice;
in New York, defendants may challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented to
the grand jury. Compare N.Y. CPL § 210.20 (McKinney 2009), with Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956).
63 N.Y. CPL § 210.30 (McKinney 2009).
6o
61
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no-bill was returned. 64 Whether or not that release did anything
to alleviate public unrest and racial tensions in the city, it
certainly added to transparency and allowed citizens (and future
voters) to get a rare glimpse into how the district attorney handled
the case. In Staten Island, by contrast, the New York Public
Advocate, the Civil Liberties Union, the Legal Aid Society, and the
NAACP sought judicial release of the transcripts in the Eric
Garner death investigation under N.Y. CPL § 190.25, and were
denied. 65 That decision to withhold the grand jury minutes further
fueled public unrest and added to the legitimacy deficit clouding
law enforcement. 66
While grand jury proceedings are traditionally conducted in
secret, this presumption of secrecy is not absolute. Indeed, federal
judges are authorized to release grand jury materials upon a
showing of "particularized need."6 7

This particularized need

standard is followed in many states, 68 and indeed was the
operative standard which the New York trial and appellate courts
followed in declining to release the Eric Garner grand jury
materials.6 9
The Eric Garner stranglehold case in Staten Island shows how
hard it is for the public to gain access to grand jury minutes, and
how corrosive the presumption of grand jury secrecy can be to
6 Benjamin Weiser, Mixed Motives Seen in Prosecutor's Decision to Release Ferguson
Grand Jury Minutes, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/26/us/
mixed-motives-seen-in-prosecutors-decision-to-release-ferguson-grand-jury-materials.html?

r-0.
65 In re James v. Donovan, 130 A.D.3d 1032, 1032 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (affirming
decision of trial court declining to release transcripts). The lower court reasoned that the
petitioners had not made a showing of "compelling and particularized need" because if
"maximizing the public's awareness" of the operations of the grand jury were a sufficient
grounds to rebut legal presumption against disclosure, there would be nothing left of the
rule. Id. at 1037-38.
66 See Matt Taibbi, Decision to Keep Garner Grand Jury Minutes Secret Continues the
Crime, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/decisionto-keep-garner-grand-jury-minutes-secret-continues-the-crime-20150320 (describing the
decisions to keep the grand jury minutes secret as "a disaster").
67 Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 223-24 (1979).
But see S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-1720(a) (2015)
68 BEALE ET AL., supra note 15, § 5.3.
(stating that the person performing official function before grand jury may release grand
jury materials "when directed by a court for the purpose of ... further[ing] justice").
69 In re James, 130 A.D.3d at 1037 ("The legal standard that must initially be applied to
petitions seeking the disclosure of grand jury material is whether the party seeking
).
disclosure can establish a 'compelling and particularized need' ....
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public confidence. 70
The close working relationship between
prosecutors and police may cause the public to question the
prosecutor's impartiality and wonder whether the secret grand
jury presentation was conducted fairly.7 1
In the Douglas Oil case, the Supreme Court identified five
specific interests advanced by keeping grand jury proceedings
secret: (1) it encourages witnesses to come forward; (2) it
encourages witnesses to testify fully and frankly; (3) it helps
protect against flight by the putative target of the grand jury
investigation; (4) it helps prevent actors from tampering with
witnesses or jurors; and (5) it serves to protect the target(s) or
subject(s) of the grand jury investigation from embarrassment and
public ridicule in the event that they are not indicted. 72 For these
reasons, the court reiterated in Douglas Oil that "the proper
functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of
grand jury proceedings" and that civil litigants must make a
showing of "particularized need" before gaining access to grand
jury materials. 73
In police shooting cases where the grand jury investigation has
terminated with a "no-bill," three of the five interests in secrecy
identified in Douglas Oil are no longer applicable: the subject of
the investigation and his associates have no incentive to tamper
with witnesses or jurors; flight will not compromise future judicial
proceedings; and, at least where the officer involved has already
been identified by the media, the reputational interests of the
subject of the investigation will not be compromised.
The sole remaining societal interests at stake in cloaking these
investigations with secrecy are (1) encouraging witnesses to come
forward and (2) encouraging them to testify frankly. Proponents of
grand jury secrecy argue that, if witnesses know that their
70 J. David Goodman, Appeals Court Rules For Transcripts in Eric GarnerCase to Remain
Sealed, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/24/nyregion/appeals-co
urt-rules-for-transcripts-in-eric-garner-case-to-remain-sealed.html ('The grand jury's decision
last December spurred protests across New York and beyond, and amplified national calls for
changes in police practices and to the grand jury system.").
71 See Christopher Mathias & Lilly Workneh, Grand Jury Declines to Indict NYPD Officer
in Chokehold Death of Eric Garner, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.huffingtonp
ost.com/2014/12/03/eric-garner-n_6263656.html (stating that the failure to indict "leaves New
Yorkers with an inescapable question").
72 Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 219.
73 Id. at 217-18.
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testimony before the grand jury may later be released, that will
have a chilling effect on their testimony. Private citizens may be
reluctant to testify or, if they do, they may be guarded and
circumspect in recounting events. But these two interests can be
accommodated-at least in part-by redacting the names and
identifying information of witnesses before any transcripts are
released. Do these two interests outweigh the need for public
understanding of the criminal justice system? Should informed
public debate about the continued utility of the grand jury be
sacrificed on the altar of secrecy?
The "particularized need" doctrine under Rule 6(e) concerns
disclosure of grand jury materials to other litigants, to civil
government officials or agencies, and to foreign tribunals. It does
not envision release of transcripts to the public. But there is also a
line of federal authority that suggests that courts have the
"inherent authority" to release grand jury transcripts to the public
in exceptional cases. 74 A leading case on this issue is In re Biaggi,
in which the district court exercised its discretion to release a
grand jury witness's testimony, where the witness was a candidate
for public office, where both the witness and the government
petitioned for its release, and where the New York Times had
falsely claimed that the witness had asserted his Fifth
Amendment rights in the grand jury.75 In affirming this exercise
of discretion, the Second Circuit stated that "[o]ur decision should
therefore not be taken as demanding, or even authorizing, public
disclosure of a witness' grand jury testimony in every case where
he seeks this and the Government consents. It rests on the
exercise of a sound discretion under the special circumstances of
this case." 76 This "specialized circumstances" doctrine has also
been invoked by District Court Judge Peter Leisure of the
Southern District of New York, who authorized disclosure of grand
77
jury materials to a historian and biographer of Alger Hiss.
Adopting the Biaggi, exception, the court exercised its inherent
authority to release certain grand jury materials because there
was "sustained and widespread historical interest in the Hiss case"
74 BEALE ET AL., supranote 15, § 5.19.
478 F.2d 489, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 494 (Friendly, J., Supplemental Opinion).
77 In re Am. Historical Ass'n, 49 F. Supp. 2d 274, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
75
76

1020

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1001

and the investigation was long over and most of the witnesses had
died.78
Assessment of whether "special circumstances" exist or whether
a "particularized need" has been met involves a flexible balancing
of the need for secrecy against the need for disclosure.7 9 Because
these doctrines represent an exception to the rule of secrecy,
decisions granting disclosure will be rare, and will be highly
dependent on context and the identity of the decision maker. If
states are more receptive to public dissemination of grand jury
minutes, they should amend their rules of criminal procedure to
more carefully identify the circumstances in which it should be
allowed.
In fact, in denying release in the Eric Garner
investigation, New York state judge William Garnett essentially
recognized that this topic was the appropriate province of
statutory reform rather than case-by-case adjudication by the
judiciary: if there is going to be any change in the presumption of
secrecy for newsworthy cases, that "should be effected by the
legislature."8 0
We maintain that state legislatures should step in to the breach
and amend their rules of criminal procedure to clarify a court's
power to release grand jury materials to the public in certain
narrow circumstances. This may help avoid the results in cases
like the Eric Garner death investigation in Staten Island. The
suggested text of our proposed provision is set forth below:
A court may order the disclosure of grand jury minutes
upon the motion of any person upon a particularized
showing that (1) the grand jury's investigation has
concluded without an indictment; (2) a significant
number of members of the general public in the county
from which the grand jury was drawn are currently
aware that a criminal investigation was conducted and
Id. at 293-95.
See, e.g., United States v. John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. 101, 112-17 (1987) (finding a
particularized need despite the availability of the grand jury materials from other
sources); United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 443, 445 (1983) (describing
the Douglas Oil standard as "highly flexible").
80 See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant New York Civil Liberties Union at 20-21, In re James
v. Donovan, 14 N.Y.S.3d 435 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (AD No 2015-02774) (siting Judge
Garnett's order).
78
79
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of the subject matter of that investigation; (3) a
significant number of members of the general public in
the county from which the grand jury was drawn know
the identity of the subject(s) of the grand jury
proceedings; and (4) there is a compelling public
interest in the revelation of investigatory facts that
A
outweighs the need for grand jury secrecy.
of
in
revelation
interest
public
compelling
investigatory facts under subsection (4) shall be
presumed whenever either the District Attorney
conducting the grand jury investigation or the state
Attorney General petitions the court for disclosure. If
the prosecutor investigated two or more suspects in
the grand jury proceedings for similar misconduct
arising out of a common nucleus of operative facts and
one or more of these suspects was indicted by the
grand jury, the court should not consider a petition
under this paragraph until the charges against the
indicted defendant have been resolved by dismissal,
change of plea, or trial. Whenever the court orders
disclosure of grand jury minutes under this paragraph,
the names and identifying information of any
witnesses, staff of the prosecutor's office, and grand
jurors shall be redacted.
Subsections 1-4 of this proposal were drawn heavily from the
recommendations of a task force appointed by the Supreme Court
of Ohio to examine improvements in the Ohio grand jury system81
following the fatal shooting of twelve-year-old Tamir Rice in 2014,
who was holding a pellet gun at the time of his death. 82 The task
force's proposed amendments to Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 6
are still pending in Ohio.8 3

One difference between our proposal

81 See THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE
To EXAMINE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE OHIO GRAND JURY SYSTEM 14-17 (July), https://www.sup

[hereinafter REPORT] (proposing
remecourt.ohio.gov/Publications/grandJuryTF/report.pdf
amendments to the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure).
82 Timothy Williams & Mitch Smith, Cleveland Officer Will Not Face Charges in Tamir
Rice Shooting Death, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/us/ta
mir-rice-police-shootiing-cleveland.html.
8 REPORT, supra note 81, Appendix B at 27.
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and the pending Ohio recommendation is that the "compelling
public interest" identified in our rule is presumed where either the
District Attorney in charge of the local grand jury or the State
Attorney General has joined in the petition for public release. As
law enforcement officials responsible for working closely with the
police to maintain public order and safety, we believe that
prosecutors are often better positioned than judges to assess the
temperature of the community and the corrosive effects grand jury
secrecy may be having on relationships between the police and
citizens. They are also closer to the investigation of violent crime
and better able to assess the likely chilling effect disclosure may
have on future witnesses. For each of these reasons, we have
inserted a presumption that allows the court to find the
"compelling public interest" prong of the disclosure rule met when
the application comes from, or is joined by, a duly elected chief
prosecutor.
V. CONCLUSION

Healthy and sustained perceptions of systemic legitimacy are
largely undergirded by the public's confidence that criminal
processes are fair. The perceived unfairness of the grand jury
system, particularly as applied to police misconduct cases, adds to
our current legitimacy deficit in criminal law. Given the secretive
nature of that body's deliberative process, it is essential that the
public have confidence that fair procedures are followed. Indeed,
the experiences in Ferguson, Missouri and Staten Island, New
York highlight some of the critical problems that can manifest
when the public's faith in the process is diminished. To help
address these concerns, this Essay proposes measures that
enhance transparency, check the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, and contribute to the sustenance of community trust in
this critical phase of the criminal litigation process. If adopted,
these measures will make the grand jury charging process-a
mainstay of American criminal adjudication-more equitable in
appearance and in fact.

